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Abstract 
This paper while agreeing with the general thrust of the Narasimham Committee Report, 
calls attention to some logical corollaries of the Report and analyses some possible 
fallout from implementing the Report. 
We agree with the view that control of banking system should be under an autonomous 
body supervised by the RBI. However at the level of individual banks, closer scrutiny of 
lending procedures may be called for than is envisaged in the Report. 
In a freely functioning capital market the potential of government bonds is enormous, but 
this necessitates restructuring of the government bond market. The government bonds 
may then also be used as suitable hedging mechanisms by introducing options and futures 
trading. We recommend freeing up the operation of pension and provident fund to enable 
at least partial investment of such funds in risky securities. 
In the corporate sector, we believe that the current 2:1 debt equity norm is too high and 
not sustainable in the long term. We envisage that high debt levels and higher interest 
rates, combined with higher business risk may result in greater incidence of corporate 
sickness. This may call for various schemes for retrenched workers and amendment to 
land laws for easy exit of companies. 
On account of interdependencies across different policies, any sequencing of their 
implementation may be highly problematic. We therefore suggest a near simultaneity in 
the implementation of various reforms in order to build up a momentum which would be 
irreversible if people are to have confidence that the reforms will endure, and if we are to 
retain our credibility with international financial institutions. Narasimham Committee Report 
Some Further Ramifications and Suggestions 
The Narasimham Committee Report is without doubt a major path- breaking piece of 
work and deserves the support of all who yearn for a more rational and effective banking 
system in this country. 
We strongly agree with the general thrust of the report and enthusiastically endorse its 
major recommendations. In particular, we welcome its proposals to delink the entire issue 
of concessional credit from the issue of banking operations, to reduce the SLR limits, to 
strengthen the capital base of banks, and to bring about a general freeing of interest rates. 
We also strongly endorse the call for greater transparency in banking reports as well as 
the proposal to strengthen the regulatory role of SEBI while abolishing the office of the 
CCI. The concept of ARF for bad debts and the idea of having special tribunals to 
expedite recovery of dues are also very practical and eminently implementable. 
The intent of this note is not to comment paragraph by paragraph on the Committee 
Report or to attempt to pick holes in what is a welcome as well as a comprehensive set of 
recommendations to reform the banking system. Instead, what we shall attempt to do here 
is to call attention to some natural corollaries of the Report, and to speculate about some 
possible fall-out from implementing the Report which the Government and the financial 
system in general may want to look out for. 
The note is structured in five parts: in the first, we shall examine the implications of the 
Report for the government bond markets. This will be followed by a look at the 
implications for the corporate sector. After this section, a brief look at the implications 
for the rural sector will be followed by some speculations regarding the financial auditing 
and consulting sector. Finally, a look at the interlinkages between the financial sector and 
the real economy, and we conclude with a word about the pace of reform. 
I. Restructuring the Government Bond Market 
Today, the government bond market is exclusively the province of banks and banking 
institutions. From the point of view of the banks, the chief function of government bonds 
is to satisfy the SLR requirements.  
One likely consequence of the proposed reduction in SLR limits from 38.5% to 25% is 
that government bonds will increasingly be subject to some of the market pressures other 
bonds experience in financial markets. The government bond market is likely to be 
increasingly integrated into the mainstream capital market with investors comparing the 
yields on government bonds with yields available on comparable financial instruments 
elsewhere.  A considerable widening and deepening of the government bond market will be 
necessary to handle these changes. Currently, while government bonds are listed on the 
stock exchanges, they are not actively traded. Trading is essentially restricted to the 
interbank market.  
The potential role of government bonds in a freely functioning capital market is 
enormous - one has only to observe that the U.S. treasury bill and bond market is the 
largest in the world, to recognize this fact.  
Because of the virtual absence of default risk on government debts, government bonds 
have the potential to offer investors a riskless investment with which to manage overall 
portfolio risk. Private corporate funds, both large and small, would be attracted to such an 
investment as a place to park cash without undue risk. Mutual funds could use the 
government bond markets to manage the risk of their overall portfolios on a day to day 
basis - switching in and out of government bonds depending on their perception of the 
likely course of the stock markets. Government bonds are also an excellent vehicle to 
manage inflation risk - in a freely functioning bond market, yields on government bonds 
would have high correlations with expected inflation rates. Forecasting of inflation rates 
would also become possible as the government bond market develops and matures. 
Various organizations including corporations, trade associations and trade unions could 
use such forecasts in pricing and bargaining. 
Individuals would be able to use government bonds as part of their investment strategy, 
especially for trusts and legacies for their children. 
To cater to such demands, a number of bond trading firms would probably arise, 
specializing in dealing in government bonds. Operating on thin, almost invisible margins, 
such firms would help keep the government bond markets efficient in the informational 
efficiency sense, rather like Salomon Brothers, for instance, in the U.S. 
Public sector enterprises and government agencies may well find that an active, efficient 
bond market which attracts private capital could be a major source of much-needed 
funds. 
SLR 
It is clear that the SLR limits are intended mainly to ensure that banks maintain adequate 
liquidity to discharge their obligations. It is difficult to see how long-term bonds - 
government or otherwise - could qualify as liquid assets. At the same time, there are a 
number of other financial assets which could qualify - short-term corporate debt 
instruments like commercial paper of the highest quality, for instance. There is a need to 
rethink the meaning of liquidity, keeping foremost the basic intent of the SLR. This 
would be in line with the spirit of the Narasimham Committee Report - to return to sound 
banking practices. It would, in any case, be necessitated by the expected integration of 
the government bond market with the rest of the financial markets.  Trust Securities 
Bringing government bonds into the mainstream of financial markets would also mean 
that they should compete openly with other high-grade securities for inclusion in the 
portfolios of provident funds and pension funds. These, and similar bodies, are currently 
required to invest only in approved Trust securities which are essentially government 
bonds. We believe that non-government securities of comparable risk should be permitted 
as investment vehicles.  
In a further move to free up the operation of pension and provident funds, employees - 
the ultimate investors - should be permitted the option of choosing to have their funds 
deployed at least partly in equity securities. We believe such liberalisation of the 
investment activities of pension and provident funds will fuel an unprecedented boom in 
such funds. Strong funds of this kind can help mobilize savings just as mutual funds have 
in the past few years.  
Strong pension funds can serve two purposes - they can act as major sources of funding, 
both loans and equity, for companies in both the private and public sector. This would 
help alleviate some of the financing crunch so many companies are facing today. 
Secondly, well-managed pension funds can provide the banking system some healthy 
competition, which would force them to strive for greater efficiency and productivity. 
Interest Rate Hedging 
With interest rates deregulated, there will be a need to develop suitable hedging 
mechanisms in the form of futures and options. 
In the long run, these mechanisms may well be needed for all securities. However, since 
government bonds would be influenced by a relatively small number of factors such as 
inflation and the term structure of interest rates, they would provide an ideal vehicle to 
experiment and learn how to operate options and futures markets in the Indian context. 
We believe government bonds should be the first choice of securities exchange boards 
contemplating introducing options and futures trading. 
II. The Corporate Sector 
If we compare corporate debt levels in India with those elsewhere, we would find that 
Indian companies operate with an astoundingly high degree of borrowing. Debt levels of 
2:1 and 3:1 are commonplace in India - whereas they would be unthinkable in most other 
financial markets of the world. 
There are many aspects to this issue - a high debt level permits control of the company 
with a very small equity investment. The results of such 'control without commitment' are 
not always healthy for the company, to say the least. When major shareholders strip a 
company of its productive earning power and leave a shell behind, at least part of the blame must be ascribed to a system which allows such extraordinary levels of debt 
financing. 
In economic downturns and recessions - inevitable in any economy - high levels of debt 
will often cause a company to fall when it should only stumble. 
Why have such high debt levels been permitted? There are probably mean reasons, rooted 
in the history of the growth pains of a developing economy. One such reason would be 
that government controlled financial institutions have often seen it as their duty to 
provide funds to an 'approved' company - namely, any company which has been able to 
secure a license. Even companies implementing the riskiest of projects have been able to 
find debt financing, often at concessional rates, once they have been able to get a license 
for the project.  
With the reform of the financial system proposed by the Narasimham Committee, 
financial institutions will begin to move away from such concerns with developmental or 
societal objectives. 
One result will be that corporations will be forced to reduce their reliance on debt 
financing. 
There are at least three other reasons why the historical high debt levels of corporations 
cannot be sustained in the future. One is that, as the interest rates are deregulated, they 
are likely to rise, at least in the short term. This is especially the case because so much of 
corporate debt has been obtained in the past at concessional rates from financial 
institutions. The increase in interest rates will increase the debt service burden sharply at 
current levels of borrowings. As the equity markets grow, equity financing will appear 
more and more attractive in comparison. 
Further, with the greater reliance upon borrowing from the capital markets rather than 
from Development Finance Institutions, there will be less flexibility in terms of 
rescheduling of payments, since it is hardly practicable to convene a meeting of 
debenture-holders at every turn.  
Finally, since high debt levels increase the overall risk of the corporation, companies will 
have to seek ways to control their financial risk as they struggle to cope with the 
increased business risks they will face in openly competitive product markets. With the 
risk of mistakes and stumbles greatly increased, companies will find their equity values 
depressed if they burden themselves with debt and thereby invite financial disasters. 
This is one of the likely but thus far unheralded consequences of the liberalization of 
industrial policy by the present government, which has left few protected markets for 
companies to keep harvesting as they have in the past.  Corporate Sickness 
Until such time as the corporate debt levels are brought down to more manageable levels, 
the corporate sector will probably see a greater incidence of sickness on account of its 
inability to absorb the higher debt service charges. This is especially true of the older, 
more established companies which will, at the same time, find their hitherto profitable 
and protected markets invaded by new and more aggressive competitors. The erosion of 
profitability and the increase in debt service burden will be a vise many such companies 
will find themselves inexorably squeezed in. 
Needless to say, this brings up issues such as exit policy, which we address in the section 
on Interlinkages. 
At this stage, however, we suggest that the debt equity norm should be reduced in a time-
bound manner, say over a period of two years, from 2:1 to 1:1, in order to give the 
corporate sector some time to adjust their long-term financing mix. Eventually, of course, 
the debt equity norm will have to be determined purely on business considerations, and 
will vary in a complex manner from industry to industry if not from company to 
company. However, a phased move in this direction must be implemented as soon as the 
Narasimham Committee report itself is implemented in its final form. 
III. Rural Sector Banks 
With the implementation of the Narasimham Committee Report, commercial banks will 
no longer be cross-subsidizing loans to the rural sector with earnings from the urban 
sector.  
While this will certainly put an end to the strategic schizophrenia banks have been 
afflicted with in the past, it does mean that commercial banks, including their rural 
subsidiaries, will find it increasingly difficult to compete with specialized rural banks. 
We anticipate that the need and the demand for credit in the rural sector will only grow as 
the economy grows. To meet this demand, a number of such specialized banks are likely 
to arise, probably floated by entrepreneurs with strong rural roots. 
Because such entrepreneurs are likely to perform much better than the rural subsidiaries 
of the existing commercial banks at the critical tasks of credit appraisal and 
understanding the real needs of rural people, we expect these new financial institutions to 
serve rural markets better. However, they will always suffer from two major problems: 
they will always be localized and therefore not adequately diversified, which will make 
them prone to failure with every local disaster; secondly, they will be short of capital in 
the short run.  
We expect that government will have to find ways to provide capital to such new banks, 
preferably in the form of venture capital in the form of equity. It is hard to see what can 
be done to solve the problem of inadequate geographical diversification without jeopardizing the strong local expertise which will be the main competitive advantage for 
these new banks. 
IV. Financial Auditing and Consulting 
We believe that the scheme proposed by the Committee for supervision of banks will be 
found to be inadequate, in as much as it relies strongly on self-regulation by banks with a 
small supervisory board. 
The main aim of bank supervision should be to protect the interests of depositors and to 
prevent any run on the banking system which may be follow any significant bank 
failures. 
We propose that the best way to ensure this would be a strong system of bank examiners, 
coupled with a system of insurance of bank deposits.  
Bank examiners would be charged with the task of auditing the portfolios of individual 
banks, at a detailed level, and to assess the overall portfolio of the individual bank. 
Examiners should be able to provide an early warning system to the bank itself as well as 
to the RBI if the bank has excessive exposure to particular risks, for instance. Such 
examiners would need to be independent of the both the bank and the RBI. Ideally, they 
would be professionals, trained in financial and investment management. We suggest that 
such the RBI hire such professional services on a contract basis. 
A number of other financial services would need to be developed.  
For instance, we have proposed in the section on government bonds that pension and 
provident funds be allowed to invest in 'high grade' debt securities other than government 
bonds. Naturally, then, there will need to be a number of independent agencies 
specializing in the appraisal of debt securities. 
V. Interlinkages with the Real Economy 
Strong interrelationships obviously exist between the banking system and the rest of the 
economy. 
Exit Policy 
Opening up the entries but keeping the exit clogged is clearly not a viable procedure. The 
need for a workable exit policy to go along with the liberal entry policies introduced by 
the current government, is a rather obvious one.  
The point to be made here is that this need for a workable exit policy will be greatly 
increased by some of the fallouts from the proposed reform of the banking sector. Quite 
apart from the fact that some banks themselves will become unviable and will have to 
start downsizing or adopting a more regional focus, we expect that the incidence of corporate failures will also increase as the debt burden increases. We have dealt with this 
issue at length in a previous section.  
Labour Laws 
The retrenchment of workers arising from the sickness of firms could be taken care of by 
the following options: 
a) Rather than force sick units to continue retaining the labour force, which is not feasible 
in the long run in any case and results in a downward spiraling of morale and productivity 
in the short run, employers could be forced to find alternative employment for workers 
elsewhere. In practice, an employer who wishes to lay off workers may have to pay a new 
employer to take them on. Some form of insurance could be obtained by the old employer 
to help defray such costs in the event of sickness. We expect an active market in this area 
if this option is resorted to.  
b) An employment retrenchment insurance scheme wherein the employer pays an 
insurance premium to an insurance company to cover retrenchment payments to 
employees (not covering retrenchment on disciplinary grounds etc.) The insurance 
company could pay the retrenched worker directly to provide him or her some cushion or 
to pay finance any retraining which would be needed for him or her to find a new job. 
Various combinations of the above schemes could also be worked out. 
In any case, as sickness and layoffs become more common, workers also need to have a 
variety of insurance and pension schemes which would not be dependent on any one 
employer. We anticipate a growing demand for independent insurance and pension fund 
companies as the proposed reforms are implemented. 
Land Laws 
Certain restrictions on the sale of certain kinds of land properties have acted as major 
impediments in the way of sick companies which could otherwise have sold the land to 
raise funds to finance rehabilitation efforts. With the increased incidence of corporate 
sickness we predict as a consequence of both the liberalized industrial policy and the 
reforms proposed in the Narasimhan Committee report, some major amendments to land 
laws appear to be urgently called for.  
VI. Pace of Reform  
Major economic reforms are being contemplated today. One issue which naturally arises 
is that of sequencing these reforms. 
At first blush, it may appear that it would be logical to implement reforms in some logical 
order of priority, based perhaps on some sense of relative urgency. However, a closer examination reveals that there is some sort of circular sequencing requirement here, 
where each reform appears to be a precondition for another. 
For example, it would make little sense to reform the banking system first, since the real 
urgency driving this set of reforms comes from the need to rationalize the entire 
economic system. On the other hand, how feasible would it be to implement the reform 
of the industrial system first, if there is not a strong banking system to finance the new 
entrants into newly deregulated industries? Again, how feasible would it be to implement 
an easy entry policy without an easy exit policy and how would an exit policy work 
without a system of insurance for retrenched workers, which would require a reformed 
financial system as a precondition? 
Indeed, reforms in industrial policy are hardly likely to win the enthusiastic support of 
industry if industry leaders did not have reason to believe that reforms in the financial 
system are imminent if not concurrent. We believe the simplest way out of such a 
dilemma is to aim for a near simultaneity in these reforms. This will necessarily mean a 
rapid pace of reform in which time is measured in days, not years. Days as units connote 
a sense of urgency not communicated by months and years. At the same time, there is a 
need to build up a momentum which would be irreversible if the people are to have 
confidence that the reforms will endure. A slow pace of reform will breed a 'wait and see' 
attitude, which would neither bring the benefits of reform nor permit continued economic 
growth under the old rules of the game. The greatest danger is uncertainty - he who 
hesitates is indeed lost.  
As we look around us, we see even more momentous reforms being introduced in the 
world today, especially in Europe and the erstwhile Soviet Union. India cannot afford to 
be slower than these countries, especially if we are to retain our credibility with 
international financial institutions.  